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Narrowing the Nation's Power:
The Supreme Court Sides with the States,
John T. Noonan, Jr. California, 2002. Pp ix, 193.
John T. Noonan, Jr., is Senior Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Robbins Professor Emeritus at the
University of California at Berkeley. The title of his latest book neatly
proclaims his thesis: the Supreme Court has been depriving Congress
of its rightful authority. Judge Noonan's exposition of this proposition
necessarily explores issues both of federalism and of separation of
powers, not least the question of the proper scope and consequences
of judicial review.
Narrowing the Nation's Power does not appear to be a book in-
tended for experts. It has rather the flavor of a polemical essay de-
signed to alert the educated lay reader to insidious dangers commonly
concealed by layers of technical jargon from the public view. The book
is not a fountain of new insights into the familiar problems it ad-
dresses; in large part it is a paraphrase of a row of anguished and vo-
luminous dissenting opinions for the edification of those lucky enough
to have been spared the agony of reading them.
For Judge Noonan is by no means alone in perceiving a wrong
turn in the Supreme Court's recent rediscovery that we live in a fed-
eral system. Apart from the Federalist Society crowd, the academic es-
tablishment is solidly in his corner on most of the issues treated in his
book, and so are four completely predictable members of the Court it-
self. He may nevertheless be among the Court's more histrionic critics,
as his sensitive antennae detect in the fell course of recent decisions
not only a grave curtailment of federal authority and an ominous shift
of power to the judiciary (p 5), but a veritable "danger to the exercise
of democratic government" as well (p 140).
Judge Noonan concentrates his fire on what he considers three
grievous errors in constitutional interpretation committed by the cur-
t Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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rent Supreme Court. The first is the familiar decision in City of Boerne
v Flores,' which refused to allow Congress to define the free exercise
of religion so broadly as to entitle religious objectors to special ex-
emptions from generally applicable state laws. His second target is a
series of cases beginning with Seminole Tribe v Florida in 1996, strik-
ing down a medley of congressional efforts to authorize suits by pri-
vate parties against unconsenting states. The third and final object of
his spleen is United States v Morrison,' where the Court by the usual
bare majority declined to countenance a federal right of action for
damages on account of rape.
To say that Judge Noonan regards these decisions as erroneous is
to understate his position. What he does is to brand them as nothing
less than products of a judicial "agenda for restoring power to the sev-
eral states" (p 140)-which is not far from calling them deliberate
perversions of the Constitution.'
I. CITY OF BOERNE V FLORES
The Boerne controversy involved the meaning of the First
Amendment provision guaranteeing "the free exercise of religion"
and the extent of Congress's authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article."' The facts presented the conventional collision between
religious and secular interests: a church's desire to expand its facilities
and a community's wish to preserve a landmark. After a century of
conflicting decisions, the Supreme Court in Employment Division v
Smith,' by a 5-4 vote, had settled (for the moment) that the Free Exer-
cise Clause forbade only discrimination on grounds of religion; it did
not relieve individuals invoking religious scruples from legal restric-
tions that applied impartially to everyone else. Congress, professing to
be horrified, voted by overwhelming majorities to overrule the Court's
decision: not even a generally applicable law could burden the exer-
cise of religion unless it was narrowly tailored to promote a "compel-
ling governmental interest."' It was this statute, the Religious Freedom
1 521 US 507 (1997).
2 517 US 44 (1996).
3 529 US 598 (2000).
4 See also p 113. Elsewhere, of course, Judge Noonan insists that the Court's "new depar-
tures have been made with great deliberateness, great sincerity, great conviction that they are es-
sential to the preservation of our federal form of government" (p 9). That is not quite to say they
were made with the conviction that they reflected the true meaning of the Constitution.
5 521 US at 517.
6 494 US 872 (1990).
7 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified at 42 USC § 2000bb
et seq (2000).
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Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), that the Supreme Court struck
down in Boerne.
The Court's reasoning was straightforward. Section 5 authorized
Congress only to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's limitations on
the states, not to add to them. Smith had already established that that
Amendment (which alone made the Free Exercise Clause binding on
individual states) did not exempt the religious from otherwise valid
general laws.8 Thus in attempting to create such exemptions Congress
could not fairly be said to be enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
unless (as in the case of literacy tests notoriously employed to circum-
vent the Fifteenth Amendment ban on racial qualifications for voting')
a more sweeping prohibition was necessary to prevent violations of
the Amendment itself. The Court found insufficient evidence of any
such need; assuming the legitimacy of the congressional goal, the
means chosen were not proportional to that end.' Not one Justice, it
should be added, dissented from these conclusions.
Judge Noonan is quite censorious. To begin with, he thinks Smith
was wrongly decided: the Constitution does create religious exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws. Smith was an "[a]brupt[] ...
change" from established doctrine (p 23), a "retreat[]" from the salu-
brious views of that Father of the Free Exercise Clause, James Madi-
son (p 25), and inconsistent with the accepted interpretation of paral-
lel constitutional provisions. "Other civil liberties," he informs us,
"would yield only to a compelling governmental interest. Why was
free exercise treated as inferior?" (p 26).
Let us pause momentarily to parse this critique. Judge Noonan
has three objections to the Smith decision: departure from precedent,
from Madison, and from similar clauses of the First Amendment. Now,
two of the decisions he tells us the Court ought to have followed
(Cantwell v Connecticut" and West Virginia State Board of Education v
Barnette'2 (pp 20-21)), to the extent relevant, were themselves depar-
tures from precedent. In its very first encounter with the religion
clauses (in Reynolds v United States," one of the "Mormon cases" that
Judge Noonan dismisses as benighted (p 18)), the Supreme Court
unanimously refused to carve a religious exemption from the law for-
bidding polygamy. While that result was arguably consistent not only
with Smith's understanding that the Free Exercise Clause requires
8 494 US at 890.
9 Compare Lassiter v Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 US 45 (1959), with
Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112 (1970). See also Mitchell, 400 US at 216 (Harlan concurring).
10 Boerne, 521 US at 536.
11 310 US 296 (1940).
12 319 US 624 (1943).
13 98 US 145 (1878).
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only government neutrality but also with RFRA's compelling-interest
test, the language of Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in the first
flag-salute case was not;"4 Judge Noonan proudly proclaims that
Barnette "overruled [Frankfurter's] unfortunate precedent" (p 21).'"
Indeed Cantwell, which he acknowledges as the first decision to sug-
gest a religious exemption from generally applicable laws (p 20), rep-
resented an even more fundamental departure from precedent-a de-
parture of which Judge Noonan emphatically approves: until shortly
before Cantwell, the Court had stoutly insisted that the Fourteenth
Amendment made none of the provisions of the Bill of Rights appli-
cable to the states." Judge Noonan's argument turns out to be not that
one should never depart from precedent, but that one should never
depart from good precedent." What makes a precedent good or bad
remains to be explained.
Second point: a "retreat[]" from Madison. The intentions of the
Framers. Originalism. Really? Elsewhere, as we shall see, Judge
Noonan seems to care less than a fig for the Framers' intentions. But
what were Madison's intentions? We are left to divine them for our-
selves. He was, to be sure, in favor of religious liberty. Does that mean
he thought the Constitution granted special privileges to the religious?
Not necessarily; that's the very question we're discussing. Some think
free exercise means people must not be disadvantaged on account of
their religion, as the Supreme Court held in Smith. And Madison? He
proposed an additional amendment that would have given conscien-
tious objectors an exemption from military service 8-which is some
evidence (I do not call it conclusive) that he thought the First
Amendment was insufficient to do the trick. As for the rest? Madison
was above all a partisan of the separation of church and state; as
President he came close (or more) to denying the Government's au-
thority to give religious organizations any benefits, even those equally
14 Minersville School District v Gobitis, 310 US 586 (1940).
15 In fact, as Philip Kurland taught us not so many years ago, Barnette did no such thing. It
created no religious exception; it was not based on the Free Exercise Clause. As Judge Noonan
discloses in an aside that vaporizes the argument he is trying to make, Barnette held that the Free
Speech Clause protected everyone from compulsion to salute the flag, without regard to religion.
Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U Chi L Rev 1, 31 (1961).
16 See, for example, Prudential Insurance Co v Cheek, 259 US 530, 538 (1922), declaring
flatly that "the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States no obligation to confer
upon those within their jurisdiction either the right of free speech or the right of silence." Judge
Noonan himself makes this point: incorporation of other Bill of Rights freedoms into the Four-
teenth Amendment went back only to 1925 (p 19).
17 Compare W.S. Gilbert, The Gondoliers Act I, in Ian Bradley, ed, The Complete Anno-
tated Gilbert and Sullivan 901 (Oxford 1996) ("When I say I detest kings, I mean I detest bad
kings.").
18 See 1 Annals of Congress 451 (1789) (Madison).
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available to others.'9 Madison's record hardly supports the conclusion
that he understood the First Amendment to grant special privileges on
religious grounds.
Third point: other clauses of the First Amendment. Yes, they have
been differently construed; but they are not in fact parallel. There are
two religion clauses; there is only one about speech. Congress is for-
bidden not only to prohibit the free exercise of religion but also to
pass any law "respecting an establishment of religion."' No compara-
ble clause forbids anything resembling the "establishment" of speech.
That there is a certain tension between the two religion clauses
has been understood for a very long time. What one arguably requires,
the other arguably forbids. The Government may not burden religion;
the Government may not support religion. To exempt religion from
burdens is to support it; to deny it benefits is to subject it to burdens.
The unique challenge of the religion clauses is to reconcile the two
provisions. One way to do this, as Professor Kurland demonstrated not
so long ago, is to interpret the two provisions together to require strict
governmental neutrality: no one shall be either disadvantaged or pre-
ferred on grounds of religion.'
Smith takes a giant step in the direction of this solution: the Free
Exercise Clause does not require religious exemptions from generally
applicable laws. Other recent decisions take another: the Establish-
ment Clause does not require that religion be excluded from benefits
that are available to others.2 If the church burns, the state may put out
the fire.23 The jury is still out on Kurland's final hypothesis: that special
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws, far from being
required by the Free Exercise Clause, actually run afoul of the estab-
24lishment provision.
Smith's neutrality principle is not the only plausible way to inter-
pret the Free Exercise Clause. It is, however, a perfectly respectable
effort to reconcile two constitutional provisions that appear to point
in opposite directions. There is no comparable difficulty with respect
19 Consider his vetoes of the Alexandria church charter (Feb 21, 1811) and the Salem land
grant (Feb 28, 1811), in James D. Richardson, ed, 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 489-90
(Bureau of National Literature 1897), both discussed in David P. Currie, The Constitution in
Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801-1829 318-24 (Chicago 2001).
20 US Const Amend I.
21 Kurland, 29 U Chi L Rev at 96 (cited in note 15).
22 See, for example, Zelman v Simmons-Harris, 536 US 639 (2002).
23 Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1,17 (1947).
24 In Smith, Justice Scalia, in dictum, suggested they did not. See 494 US at 890. But see
Texas Monthly, Inc v Bullock, 489 US 1 (1989) (striking down a tax exemption available only for
religious publications). The exemption of conscientious objectors from the most recent military
draft (invoked by Judge Noonan at p 38) is not a good counterexample; the Court went out of its
way to interpret the statute to include virtually all conscientious objectors in order to avoid what
it considered a serious constitutional question. See United States v Seeger, 380 US 163 (1965).
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to freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, or of petition. That the
Free Exercise Clause is construed differently from these provisions is
not to give it "inferior" status; it is merely to recognize the unique
gravitational pull of the Establishment Clause.
Against this background, what does Judge Noonan have against
the Court's conclusion in Boerne that Congress has no power to set
aside the Smith decision? It is not merely that, as Justice O'Connor
argued, the Court should have reconsidered Smith and overruled it."
It is apparently that Congress rather than the Court should decide
what the Free Exercise Clause means, by virtue of its authority to "en-
force" the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions. For the framers of
that amendment, he tells us, were "deeply suspicious of the Supreme
Court, still under a cloud for its notorious decision in Dred Scott"
(p 28).
The drafters of the fourteenth amendment did not desire to de-
stroy a federal structure or concentrate all power in Congress.
Still less, however, did they have in mind a grant of power to the
court. They gave power for the amendment's enforcement to
Congress (p 28).
Only Congress may enforce the Fourteenth Amendment? How
many of those decisions Judge Noonan praises for creating religious
exceptions under the Free Exercise Clause would have to be aban-
doned if that were so? And what about the fact that Congress rejected
an earlier draft of the Amendment that would have done nothing but
authorize Congress to legislate to protect civil rights?6 The Amend-
ment did two things: it imposed explicit restrictions on the states that
have always been understood, like those found elsewhere in the Con-
stitution, to be enforceable in the courts; and it empowered Congress
to provide additional enforcement tools (such as civil and criminal
remedies) by legislation."
Judge Noonan waxes righteous over the Court's "new" require-
ment that in determining the validity of legislation enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment the means must be proportional to the end
(pp 35, 39):
25 Boerne, 521 US at 544-45 (O'Connor dissenting).
26 See Charles Fairman, 6 History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Reconstruction
and Reunion 1864-88 1270-83 (MacMillan 1971).
27 Ex parte Virginia, 100 US 339 (1880), cited by Judge Noonan to establish that the courts
have no power to enforce or protect rights guaranteed by the Amendment (pp 28-29), does con-
tain language declaring that the Amendment gave enforcement authority to Congress rather
than to the courts. What it did, however, was to uphold a statute making it a federal crime to
deny rights the Amendment guaranteed, while a companion case gave a purely judicial remedy
for a similar violation. See Strauder v West Virginia, 100 US 303 (1880) (reversing a criminal con-
viction because of the exclusion of blacks from the jury).
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This formula was unprecedented. Proportionality in legislation!
Who would measure the proportion? Implicitly, the answer was
"the court." What measure would the court use? Implicitly, the
answer was "whatever we find handy" (p 35).
What is there about the innocuous term "proportionality" to trig-
ger this outburst? The terminology may be novel, but the principle is
not. Once the end is recognized as legitimate, the relation between the
end and the means is always central to determining the necessity and
propriety of federal legislation8- and indeed commonly to determin-
ing the validity of state legislation too, as in myriad cases involving
equal protection and free speech-not to mention cases that would
have arisen under RFRA itself, which required a particularly close fit
between ends and means.
The argument thus boils down to a disagreement as to the degree
of deference the Court should pay to congressional interpretation of
the Constitution. Judge Noonan sneers at the Court's conclusion that
it had the right to determine the issue for itself: "Six or even five of us
count for more than five hundred of you ... ." (p 39). If that sounds
like an attack on the whole principle of judicial review, it does not
stand alone: "The decisions now to be reviewed have been possible
because the constitution has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
as confiding to that court the power definitively to interpret the con-
stitution." (p 7).
Was that wrong? Sure, if you think the Framers were so foolish as
to appoint the rabbit to guard the cabbages.29 That was not the domi-
nant view in the Constitutional Convention, or in the early Congress;
it was not the view of Alexander Hamilton; it was not the view of
James Madison, who in introducing the Bill of Rights in the House as-
sured us the courts would enforce them, as they have always done.,°
Judge Noonan seems to like judicial review well enough when the
cases come out his way; Cantwell, Barnette, and other decisions he ap-
plauds were products of judicial review.
Perhaps the key word in Judge Noonan's attack on the Court's
understanding of judicial review is "definitively": perhaps the vice is
that the Court's decision is final. "Our words," he paraphrases the
Court as saying, "constitute the constitution that is now in force"
(p 40). Both Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln, it is true, denied
28 See, for example, McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316, 421 (1819), which Judge Noonan
praises to the skies (pp 29-30).
29 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137,178 (1803).
30 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801 120
(Chicago 1997); Paul M. Bator, et al, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal Sys-
tem 8-9 (Foundation 3d ed 1988); Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist
521,524-27 (Wesleyan 1961); 1 Annals of Congress 457 (1789) (Madison).
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that the Court's decisions were binding on other branches of govern-
ment as a matter of stare decisis: each branch had the right and the
duty to interpret the Constitution for itself.' By the same token, Con-
gress's interpretation is not binding on the Court; the judges too must
make their own determination as to what the Constitution means.
And it seems to me that, whoever had the better of the argument
about the First Amendment, the Court in Boerne was right about the
Fourteenth: the text of § 5 shows that Congress's power is to enforce
the provisions of the amendment, not to amend them.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
We come to sovereign immunity. Judge Noonan presents his
views on this question in the form of a Socratic dialogue in which all
the participants agree that the Court's decisions are illegitimate. The
burden of the argument is that the Constitution says nothing about
immunity (p 41); not even the Eleventh Amendment uses the term
(pp 61-62, 66-67). The latter point, I should think, is trivial: when the
Constitution says the judicial power shall not be read to embrace suits
against states by citizens of other states, it might as well have said
there was sovereign immunity.
More serious is the argument, made almost monthly by four dis-
senting Justices in recent years, that the Court has extended sovereign
immunity far beyond the confines of the Eleventh Amendment-to
suits brought by citizens of the defendant state, for example, or by
federal corporations, or by foreign states." Of course it has, and the
Court has not helped its cause by thoughtlessly insisting, from time to
time, that it has found these extended immunities in the Eleventh
Amendment itself.4 Judge Noonan accuses the Justices of making
them up out of whole cloth. "What law," asks one of the interlocutors
in his dialogue, immunizes states from actions by their own citizens
(p 74)?
Judge Noonan knows the answer to that question. Every law stu-
dent knows it, for the Supreme Court spelled it out over a hundred
31 See Andrew Jackson, Veto message to extend charter of the Bank of the United States
(July 10, 1832), in James D. Richardson, ed, 2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 576,582 (US
Congress 1900); Paul M. Angle, ed, Created Equal? The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of
1858 26,36-37 (Chicago 1958) (quoting Lincoln's speech at Chicago, July 10, 1858).
32 See David P. Currie, RFRA, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev 637 (1998).
33 See, for example, Monaco v Mississippi, 292 US 313 (1934) (foreign state); Smith v
Reeves, 178 US 436 (1900) (federal corporation); Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1890) (citizen of
defendant state). None of these decisions, the reader will note, can fairly be described as recent.
34 See, for example, Board of Trustees v Garrett, 531 US 356, 363 (2001) ("Although by its
terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases
have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States.").
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years ago in Hans v Louisiana .3 Article III must be read against the
background of a tradition of sovereign immunity; the King was not
suable without his consent. Not one but three of the most important
Framers announced flatly during the ratification debates that not even
the provision extending the judicial power to controversies between
states and citizens of other states would displace the traditional rule.
When the Supreme Court disagreed with this conclusion in Chisholm
v Georgia,7 the country overturned its decision as quickly as you can
say "Jack Robinson": not even the only clause that mentions states as
parties to private suits should be interpreted to permit them to be
sued without consent.8 A fortiori, said the Court in Hans, other
clauses that are less suggestive of any intention to abrogate immunity
should not be so interpreted either.9 What law provided the basis for
sovereign immunity in Hans? Private suits against unconsenting states
do not fall within the federal judicial power as defined by Article III.
But it doesn't say that, Judge Noonan's debaters insist, in the
Constitution (pp 151-53).40 No, it doesn't. Where does it say that states
may not tax the Bank of the United States?4' That states may not se-
cede from the Union? 2 That new states are admitted on an equal foot-
ing with the old?" That the President cannot be sued for damages aris-
ing out of actions taken in the course of his official duties?" That con-
fidential communications within the executive branch are presump-
tively privileged against involuntary disclosure?43 The Constitution
cannot be construed by looking only at its words; history, tradition,
consequences, and purpose help us to understand what the words of
the Constitution mean.
Hans is the fulcrum on which the entire argument turns. If Hans
is right, almost everything the Court has done since in the sovereign
immunity cases follows easily.i If the case is not within Article III,
35 134 US 1,15 (1890).
36 See Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 533 (2d ed 1836) (James Madison); id at 555 (John Marshall); Federalist
81 (Hamilton) in Cooke, ed, The Federalist 541, 548-49 (cited in note 30). Judge Noonan dis-
misses these observations with the statement that they should not be taken "out of context" (pp
80, 83), but all of them were made in response to the suggestion that Article III permitted uncon-
senting states to be sued in federal court.
37 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793).
38 US Const Amend XI.
39 See Hans, 134 US at 15.
40 See also p 12: "doctrinal devices . . . that have no footing in the constitution."
41 See McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316,436 (1819).
42 See Texas v White, 74 US 700 (1869).
43 See Coyle v Smith, 221 US 559 (1911).
44 See Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 US 731 (1982).
45 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974).
46 I say "almost" not only because of Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445 (1976), which is dis-
cussed below (see text accompanying notes 58-61), but because the Court got the Commerce
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Congress cannot bring it within the jurisdiction of a federal court. That
was the lesson of a thousand decisions seeking to determine whether a
particular dispute constituted a "case" or "controversy" within Article
III." It was the lesson of Chief Justice Taney in The Genesee Chief's
and of six Justices in the Tidewater case. 9 Chief Justice Marshall said it
in his usual magisterial way in 1807: "Turn to the article of the consti-
tution of the United States, for the statute cannot extend the jurisdic-
tion beyond the limits of the constitution."'
Thus of course Congress cannot make states suable by private
plaintiffs under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act," or for patent in-
fringement,'2 or for discrimination on grounds of age 3 or disability."1 If
there were no constitutional immunity, it might well be necessary and
proper to the creation of such rights to open the federal courts to pri-
vate suits against states in order to enforce them; but Article III limits
the jurisdiction that may be given to the federal courts. And of course
Congress cannot make unconsenting states suable in state courts" or
16before federal agencies either: the same considerations that per-
suaded the Court in Hans that the Framers did not intend to permit
suits against unconsenting states demonstrate that they would not
have wanted Congress to subject them to suit in any other forum.5'
Clause question wrong too the first time it faced it, upholding an abrogation of immunity under
that provision by a 5-4 vote in Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co, 491 US 1 (1989), where there was
no opinion of the Court.
47 See, for example, Hayburn's Case, 2 US (2 Dall) 408 (1792); Muskrat v United States, 219
US 346 (1911).
48 53 US 443 (1852). The statute in issue, which extended admiralty jurisdiction to the
Great Lakes, was upheld only because the Court was willing to redefine maritime cases for pur-
poses of Article III; the Court made clear that Congress could not confer jurisdiction outside
that Article by enacting legislation under the Commerce Clause.
49 National Mutual Insurance Co v Tidewater Transfer Co, 337 US 582 (1949).The Court in
Tidewater upheld a statute conferring diversity jurisdiction in cases in which one of the parties
was a citizen of the District of Columbia, but six Justices denied that Congress could extend the
judicial power beyond Article Il1.
50 Hodgson v Bowerbank, 9 US (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). The statute before the Court pur-
ported to grant jurisdiction whenever an alien was a party; the Court chopped it down to consti-
tutional size.
51 See Seminole Tribe, 517 US at 47.
52 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v College Savings Bank,
527 US 627 (1999).
53 See Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62 (2000).
54 See Garrett, 531 US at 360-61.
55 See Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999).
56 See Federal Maritime Commission v South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 US 743
(2002).
57 The same considerations that limited federal judicial power in Hans, in other words,
limit federal legislative authority to make states suable outside the federal courts. Once again, in
describing the central policy underlying sovereign immunity as a concern for state "dignity," the
Court has shot itself in the foot, and Judge Noonan understandably makes fun of the Court's
contention (pp 52-54). The real concern is state autonomy, not dignity; the power to adjudicate,
like the power to tax, is the power to destroy.
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The one conspicuous uncorrected flaw in the Court's recent deci-
sions was the conclusion in Fitzpatrick v Bitzerm that Congress can lift
a state's immunity when it legislates to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. That Amendment, the Court explained, came after the
Eleventh, and on its face it limited state authority. 9 As I have said
elsewhere, I find this argument unconvincing. The Fourteenth
Amendment came after the Eighth as well as the Eleventh, but so far
as I know no one has suggested that Congress may ordain cruel and
unusual punishments to enforce its provisions.0
The consequence of Bitzer is that every litigant endeavors to
squeeze his case into the Fourteenth Amendment in order to persuade
the Court to uphold a congressional abrogation of sovereign immu-
nity. Simple torts are transmogrified into takings of property in the
face of contrary Supreme Court precedent; flat prohibitions of dis-
crimination are defended as means of enforcing a constitutional ban
on that which lacks a rational basis. As in Boerne, the alleged cure
goes so far beyond the disease that the Court quite rightly concludes
that Congress is not enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment at all but
imposing new substantive duties on the states. It may do so under cur-
rent caselaw,6' but not under the Fourteenth Amendment; and thus de-
spite Bitzer it may not abrogate the states' immunity.
Judge Noonan seems to suggest at one point that it is "unethical"
to deny relief to the injured party in all of these cases (p 56). States,
like other people, ought to pay when they do wrong (p 55). The pre-
amble tells us one purpose of the Constitution was to establish justice
(pp 11-12). For every right there should be a remedy (p 4).
Well, sure there should. Never mind that in the case everyone
cites for this principle the Court denied a remedy, and that for thirty-
five years no court in the country was authorized to give one. Sover-
eign immunity is unjust; states ought to pay when they violate individ-
ual rights. The Illinois legislature has just waived sovereign immunity
for a variety of federal suits the Supreme Court had held it did not
have to defend.63 Bravo! But unethical? Unethical to follow the law
58 427 US 445 (1976).
59 Id at 456.
60 David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century 573 (Chi-
cago 1990).
61 See Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528 (1985). The Court
has vacillated on this issue as well. United States v California, 297 US 175 (1936), held the state
was not immune; National League of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976), held it was; Garcia held it
was not.
62 See Kendall v Stokes, 37 US 524 (1838); McClung v Silliman, 19 US 598 (1821); Mclntire
v Wood, 11 US (7 Cranch) 504 (1813); Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
63 State Lawsuit Immunity Act, Pub Act No 93-0414,2003 I11 Legis Serv 2259-60 (West), to
be codified at 745 ILCS 5/1.5.
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because we think it bad policy? Maybe so, if we are talking about
sending innocent people to gas chambers in Nazi Germany. But what
happens to Judge Noonan's precious powers of Congress if the courts
generalize this principle? No law can be enforced if the judges don't
like it. Now who is it who's advocating government by the unelected
judiciary?
Lots of people agree with Judge Noonan that the Supreme Court
has carried sovereign immunity farther than the Constitution can sup-
port it. But the Court has buttressed its conclusions with serious his-
torical arguments that seem to me entitled to respect even from those
who think them ultimately unpersuasive; one ought not to dismiss the
Justices as either fools or knaves.
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Finally, Judge Noonan argues that the Court was seriously mis-
guided in concluding, in United States v Morrison,6 that Congress was
without power to create a cause of action for damages on account of
rape.
Hooray for the Court! When, after years of upholding federal
regulation of even the most isolated nooks and crannies of the econ-
omy on the basis of increasingly imaginative Rube Goldberg scenarios
about their ultimate effect on commerce, the Court in United States v
Lopez finally called a halt, it was about time. Knee-jerk dissenters
predictably argued, more or less, that if there are guns in schools peo-
ple will get shot, and that dead people don't engage in interstate
commerce."' Nor do they while recovering from rape, as the same four
Justices argued in Morrison. Can these judges really believe what
they are saying? James Madison told the people of New York the
powers delegated to the Federal Government were few and defined,
those reserved to the states numerous and indefinite.4 The Tenth
Amendment assumes that there are powers not delegated to the
United States; the dissenters would read it out of the Constitution.
Judge Noonan does not waste much ink trying to defend the
proposition that Congress can regulate whatever it likes under the
Commerce Clause. His principal attack on the Commerce Clause
holding proceeds by way of ridicule:
But activity that Congress regulated for its substantive effect on
commerce, the court said, must itself have a commercial charac-
64 529 US 598 (2000).
65 514 US 549 (1995).
66 See id at 618-25 (Breyer dissenting).
67 See 529 US at 631-35 (Souter dissenting). Again I paraphrase. The essence is there.
68 Federalist 45 (Madison), in Cooke, ed, The Federalist 308,313 (cited in note 30).
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ter, it must be an economic activity of some kind. Gender-related
crime did not have a commercial character. It was not a form of
economic activity. QED: As neatly as a demonstration in geome-
try, the conclusion followed that Congress lacked the power in
regulating commerce to ban violence against women (p 127).
Why the conclusion did not follow Judge Noonan leaves to the
reader; this is criticism by innuendo. Does he think rape is an eco-
nomic activity? Does he take issue instead with the Court's test? The
New Deal revolution was about economic activity; as Justice Kennedy
wrote in Lopez, the lesson of the New Deal cases is that Congress can
regulate the national market.6
Judge Noonan goes on to raise questions (though less sharply)
about the Court's rejection of a second suggested justification for the
federal rape law in Morrison. For in that case, as in Boerne and the
sovereign-immunity decisions, the challenged statute was also de-
fended as an exercise of congressional power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment.
This argument takes a little explaining. Rape is not ordinarily a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was not the University of
Virginia that allegedly raped the complainant, and the Amendment
forbids only state action. But the state was said not to have been dili-
gent enough in prosecuting her assailants, and since it prosecuted a
whole lot of other offenders, it was argued, it had denied her the equal
protection of the laws.
There is a grain of sense in this equation. Although the Court has
rightly held that the Due Process Clause imposes no affirmative duty
on the Government to protect one citizen from another,70 the text of
the Equal Protection Clause reveals that one of its purposes was to
require the states to afford blacks the same protection from third par-
ties it afforded everyone else; if it is a crime to kill whites it must be a
crime to kill blacks as well." Now that the Clause is understood to for-
bid discrimination on grounds of gender as well as race, the same must
be true of men and women. The difficulty in Morrison, as in the other
cases we have been discussing, was one of proof: had it been suffi-
ciently demonstrated that Virginia was protecting only men and not
women from physical assault?
One swallow, one supposes, does not make a summer. Not every
failure to convict a woman's attacker establishes prosecutorial dis-
crimination against women. Congress purported to find a pattern of
underenforcement of laws against sexual assaults, which are notori-
69 514 US at 574 (Kennedy concurring).
70 See DeShaney v Winnebago County, 489 US 189 (1989).
71 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US 36,70 (1873).
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ously difficult to prove; five Justices found the evidence insufficient to
justify federalizing a subject that no serious externalities prevented
the states from regulating quite adequately on their own.7,
Not one of the dissenters, Judge Noonan acknowledges, voted to
sustain the rape law as an exercise of Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment (p 135). To do so, he argues, would only have
required them to conclude, as he does, "that a state acted when it
shirked its responsibilities" and that a federal remedy against the of-
fending individual was an appropriate sanction for a state's failure to
act (p 136). All that stood in the way of the first of these conclusions,
he announces in his usual neutral way, is a handful of nineteenth-
century decisions that "preserved the individual freedom of the mem-
bers of the Klan and the liberty of racist innkeepers" (id). Obviously
there could be no objection to overruling any such decisions.
CONCLUSION
Judge Noonan is on the side of the angels. Religious liberty ought
not to be infringed. Sovereign immunity is unjust. Rape is a bad thing.
Ergo Congress has power to correct all these evils under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Unfortunately the matter is not so simple. Neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor any other provision gives Congress general authority
to deliver us from evil. What § 5 authorizes Congress to do is to en-
force the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment-to provide
remedies to redress or deter a state's deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, denial of the equal protection of
the laws, or abridgement of the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States. The free exercise of religion is one of the liberties
the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state infringement, but
free exercise has never been simply a matter of exempting religious
people from generally applicable laws. Powerful considerations of
equality, together with the Establishment Clause, militate against the
conclusion that the First Amendment creates a caste system in which
the religious are singled out for preferential treatment on the basis of
their beliefs. Sovereign immunity, while unjust, has substantial and re-
spectable roots in our constitutional history. And the Equal Protection
Clause does not require the impossible: not every unjustified failure to
prosecute an alleged criminal offender amounts to invidious discrimi-
nation against the class to which the unfortunate victim belongs.
The Supreme Court, Judge Noonan tells us, is on the side of the
states, not the angels, in the controversies he has elected to discuss. In-
72 See Morrison, 529 US at 616.
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deed it is, because the Court is convinced that in these cases the law is
on the side of the states. In a society that prides itself on the rule of
law-and whose Constitution proclaims itself "the supreme law of the
land" -to be on the side of the law is to be on the side of the angels.
Reasonable minds may differ as to whether the Court was right in any
or all of the cases Judge Noonan dissects; I happen to think it was. I
also think Chief Justice Marshall was right when he said it was the
Court's responsibility to help see to it that other governmental organs
not exceed the limits of their authority, and I am glad that it is; judicial
review has spared us a vast array of unconstitutional actions, legisla-
tive and executive, state and federal, over the past two hundred fifteen
years.
No book that employs the term "velleity" (p 5) can be all bad.
Nevertheless, even if one disagrees with the Court's decisions (and
nobody agrees with all of them), it seems to me one has no cause to go
about insisting that the sky is falling. Judge Noonan to the contrary
notwithstanding, I think the reader can rest assured that in the Court's
current course of decisions there is nothing remotely resembling a
"present danger to the exercise of democratic government" (p 140).
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